Islamism Against Zionism: Muslim Identity and the Middle East Conflict

elif kayi  |  february 2008

Marching for Al Quds: Demonstrators mark Ayatollah Khomeini’s special day in Berlin, October 2005 Photo credit: Harry’s Place

 

FOR THE CASUAL OBSERVER looking to capture Islamist attitudes towards Zionism and Israel, there are few spectacles better than Al Quds Day. Instituted by Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, the year of the Islamic Revolution, and held on the last Friday during the month of Ramadan, the day is dedicated to protesting Israel's control of Jerusalem (Al Quds in Arabic, Al Qods in Persian), one of the three cities regarded as holy by the Muslim faith.

Al Quds Day has become an institution across the Arab and Islamic worlds. In more recent years, it has been observed in Europe too. In cities like Berlin, Paris, Toronto and London, Islamist activists have taken to the streets, often accompanied by non-Muslim leftists. Many of the slogans deployed at these events - notably, "Hand in Hand Against the Zionists!" - are sanitized for a European leftist audience. However, antisemitic cries like "Death to Israel!" are also on display, leaving little doubt as to the antisemitic essence of Al Quds Day. Indeed, at the 2002 Al Quds Day demonstration in Berlin, these calls for Israel's annihilation passed unremarked. It was not until the following year that a counterdemonstration revealed the antisemitic underpinnings of this opposition towards Zionism.

What, in such a context, does "Zionism" actually mean? There are two obvious points to make: firstly, that Zionism is a byword for malevolence and hostility, above all towards Muslims; secondly that such a perception has no factual foundations. But that does not explain why Zionism has taken on this meaning for so many Muslims, particularly those who do not live in Muslim countries. As I will show, with a particular focus on Islamist literature in the Turkish language, this manifestly negative meaning was never pre-ordained, but rather evolved over time, in parallel with the Middle East conflict. The principal consequence has been that opposition to "Zionism" has become an article of faith and a badge of Islamic identity in a world of uncertainties.

Islamist Discourse on "Zionism"

To begin with, a brief explanation for my focus on Turkish Islamism is in order. By comparison with Islamist literature on Zionism in the Arabic language, the Turkish version is not very well known. Yet the Turkish contribution is significant for several reasons, among them the traditionally strong diplomatic and military relations between Turkey and Israel and the existence, in Europe, of large Turkish Muslim communities [1]. In addition, while political Islam aspires to the creation of a global community, or umma, unfettered by linguistic or national boundaries, for analytical purposes, its national variants should not be ignored.

Opposition to Zionism was not always uniform in the Muslim world. Indeed, some Arab leaders, notably Faysal ibn Hussein, who became King of Iraq in 1921, even sought an accomodation with the Zionist movement. However, in the years following the 1917 Balfour Declaration, through which the British government promised a "national home" to the Jewish community in Palestine, Arab enmity towards Zionism steadily intensified. In Turkey, newly emerged from the ashes of Ottoman Empire, this Arab antagonism was echoed in the books and periodicals of the burgeoning Islamist movement. These sources are one component which enable us to trace the ideological development of anti-Zionism in the Muslim world.

“…(O)pposition to “Zionism” has become an article of faith and – especially among younger Muslims living in Europe – a badge of Islamic identity in a world of uncertainties”

In the twilight years of the Ottoman Empire, conspiracy theories began to circulate about the fall of the Caliphate (in other words, the ending of Islamic rule). These theories were brazenly antisemitic, insisting that the Young Turk movement which brought about the end of Ottoman rule was really a plot composed of Jews, freemasons and Dönmeh [2]. The basic claim was that the Turkish republic was really a "Jewish" republic; for evidence, the conspiracy theorists pointed to the fact that many of the leading figures in the Young Turk movement came from the Greek city of Salonika (Thessaloniki), which was both a center of Spehardic Jewry and the Dönmeh community. These outlandish theories continue to nourish contemporary Turkish Islamism, as demonstrated by numerous articles in newspapers such Yeni Safak, Vakit and Milli Gazete, which is close to the Milli Görüs Islamist movement [3].

As the 1920s progressed, the terms "Zionism" and "Zionist" began to filter into Islamist usage. The two most influential antisemitic authors of the pre-1948 period came from the pan-Turkish movement. There was Nihal Atsiz, who propagated the racist theories of Nazism [4]. And there was Cevat Revat Atilhan, who adopted an Islamist orientation. In their writings, both men used the term "Zionist" as a synonym for "Jew", always presented as an enemy.

The reflections of Atilhan underline the inherent antisemitism within Turkish Islamism, something that deepened in the immediate period following Israel's creation. According to Rifat N. Bali, a Turkish-Jewish historian, one-third of the articles in the Islamist magazine Sebil-ür Re?ad in 1948 concerned Zionism and Judaism [5].

“Within this clash of identities, of “oppressed” against “oppressor”, of those who are integrated and accepted against those who are not, it is perfectly acceptable to attack Jews as Jews”

Among Arab nationalists and Islamists alike, it was the pervasiveness of these ideas which were, to a great extent, behind the refusal to acknowledge the true facts of the Holocaust. As a result, a decisive second stage in the construction of Zionism's meaning was inaugurated. Negative attitudes towards the Holocaust - at best, haughty and ambiguous, at worst, involving outright denial - encouraged the introduction of comparisons of Nazism and Zionism on the international political scene, in order to marry western objections to Nazism with anti-Zionist imperatives. On 4th December 1961, Ahmed Shuqairy, the first leader of of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), declared: "Zionism is worse than Fascism, uglier than Nazism, more hateful than imperialism and more dangerous than imperialism. Zionism is a combination of all such characteristics." [6] Such sentiments were eventually repeated by Islamists outside the Arab world, from Turkey to Pakistan.

These associations were absorbed into popular imagery so that they eventually became commonplace. Looking back at key events related to the Middle East over the last forty years, each one provided a basis for making the association between Zionism and Nazism and for reviving antisemitic conspiracy theories. The Six Day War of June 1967, the Lebanon War of 1982 and the first and second Palestinian intifadas provided ample opportunities for making the Nazi analogy. As for "Jewish power" conspiracy theories, these were always in circulation, reaching a peak following the atrocities of 11th September, 2001.

Antisemitism in the Age of anti-Imperialism

During the 1960s, what can be called the anti-imperialist interpretation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, casting Zionists as colonists and Palestinians as oppressed colonizers, grew in influence in both western and Middle Eastern circles. But this did not obscure the distinctive Islamist perspective. Rather than speaking the language of anti-colonialism, Islamist anti-Zionism remained firm that the battle was one which pitted Muslims against Jews.

Looked at more closely, there were, in the Turkish arena, two key themes common to Islamist discourse elsewhere: the rejection of western influence and culture and the standardization of anti-Jewish rhetoric and polemics [7]. Necmettin Erbakan (who eventually served as Turkey's Prime Minister between 1996 and 1997) was the author of the original Milli Görü? (National Vision) document In an interview granted to the newspaper Milliyet in 1969, he stated: "There are three directions in the world: communism, Zionism or nationalism and respect for the sacred things of each nation. We are obliged to choose the third path." [8] Launching his first political party in 1970, Milli Nizam Partisi (Party of National Order), [9] he announced that party membership would be refused to "Jews and freemasons".

“…A decisive second stage in the construction of Zionism’s meaning was inaugurated. Negative attitudes towards the Holocaust – at best, haughty and ambiguous, at worst, involving outright denial – encouraged the Palestinian national movement to introduce comparisons of Nazism and Zionism to the international political scene, in order to marry western objections to Nazism with anti-Zionist imperatives”

Islamist activists in Europe today echo Erbakan's line of argument. At the same time - in some cases, at least - they take greater care to distinguish between Jews, who constitute nothing more and nothing less than a religious community, and Zionism, which is an inherently anti-Islamic, malevolent phenomenon. They have also had some success in recruiting anti-Zionist Jews, both individuals and groups, to parrot this line. The London organizers of Al Quds Day, for example, ensured that members of the ultraorthodox Jewish sect, Neturei Karta, marched at the head of the demonstration, with anti-Zionist slogans prominently on display. In May 2006, the Islamic Human Rights Commission in the UK held a conference entitled "Against Zionism: Jewish Perspectives". Among the speakers was an ultraorthodox Canadian academic, Yakov Rabkin. Needless to say, such individuals and groups have never challenged the common Islamist presentation of Judaism as the belief in a "falsified Torah"; that is, a soiled parody of a religion.

A particularly malicious version of this charge can be found in the writings of Ahmed Kalkan, an Islamist author whose works are widely available in Turkish bookstores in Germany. Kalkan, who has lived in both France and The Netherlands, argues that the loss of Muslim identity leads to what he terms yahudilesme (making Judaic). Kalkan lists a number of characteristics of "Judaism", among them: "the broken promise with God, transformation into monkeys, the intrigues and breakdown, lack of recognition and murder of the prophets, the cruelty, betrayal, banishment by God, and failure to experience the sentiment of jealousy. They live like pigs and are thus transformed into pigs..." The passage ends with the following words, "The most dangerous are not the Jews overseas, but the Jew who is in us." [10]

Identity Crisis in Europe

As in the Middle East and the wider Islamic world, the majority of Muslims living in Europe are unfamiliar with the historical context in which Zionism was forged, as well as the different political tendencies within the Zionist movement. Since the term is automatically linked with negative images, rational and historically situated understanding becomes nearly impossible.

This resistance is also bound up with very powerful emotional and psychological considerations. Rejection of Israel has become a critical aspect of the renewal of Muslim identity, particularly among Muslim minorities in the west. Attempting to understand Zionism is the equivalent of abandoning Palestine, an integral part of what is known in theological terms as the Dar al Islam (domain of Islam) - and, therefore, of abandoning Islam itself. Expressed in emotional terms, what is under the microscope here is the betrayal and loss of Muslim identity: a Muslim who attempts to understand Zionism would no longer be a Muslim.

Clearly, not every Muslim feels this way; indeed, it is possible to make the case that only a minority consciously subscribes to this view. But the degree and intensity of Islamist agitation among European Muslims means that many in these communities respond passively to antisemitism, irrespective of whether it is formally presented as anti-Zionism.

“Rather than speaking the language of anti-colonialism, Islamist anti-Zionism remained firm that the battle was one which pitted Muslims against Jews”

The works of Adnan Oktar, better known by his pseudonym Harun Yahya, are a salient case in point. Oktar is an extremely crude writer, but also a prolific one, which has boosted his popularity. He has written dozens of books and articles propagating Islam - attacking Darwinism is also a favourite topic. In his most famous work, Judaism and Freemasonry, Oktar affirms that the main mission of the Jews and freemasons of Turkey is to destroy the moral, religious and spiritual values of the country. He describes Zionism as being "a racist ideology, opposed to religion, which aims to control the world and which presents a threat to world peace." [11] Oktar adds that it is wrong to perceive Zionism as a movement to create a Jewish state; this is merely a cover for other designs that are "not very well known in the West". What this amounts to are the standard conspiracy theories concerning Zionism's ambition for global domination. When these views are correlated with Oktar's other writings, which discuss Judaism in explicitly hostile terms and which advance Holocaust denial, [12] it becomes impossible to separate antisemitism from anti-Zionism.

Whither the Youth?

Among younger Europeans Muslims, writings such as those outlined above are influential, but there are other factors involved too. Muslim identity is fractured and complicated, determined by such variables as family influence, income, social environment, the general influences which come from living in non-Muslim societies and the growing prejudice against Muslims in many of these societies. As a consequence, political issues can provide a foundation for a more secure identity. Public debates and conflicts over the building of neighborhood mosques, whether young women have a right to wear the hijab, whether American and European involvement in the Middle East constitute a war against Islam, all encourage identification with the Palestinians as victims. Given that this identification is based upon the recognition that there are political as well as religious imperatives embedded in Muslim identity, what is a conflict between nations becomes a conflict between religions.

“Public debates and conflicts over the building of neighborhood mosques, whether young women have a right to wear the hijab, whether American and European involvement in the Middle East constitute a war against Islam, all encourage identification with the Palestinians as victims”

The growing significance of Palestine for European Muslims is partly the result of the globalization of information (or, more precisely, opinion), in the form of the internet, satellite television and other technological innovations which ease communication. It also flows from the distinctive circumstances of second and third generation immigrants. They reject the parochial nature of their antecedents identity, with its emphasis on a particular language and particular sets of religious and cultural customs - what the French sociologist Olivier Roy describes as "a crisis of pristine cultures" [13].

Simultaneously, young Muslims born in Europe come into active contact with peers who trace their origins to other countries. There is an interesting question here about the relationship between Muslims of Arab and non-Arab origin. To take Germany as an example, the number of immigrants originating from the Middle East is relatively small [14] , but a great part of that community is facing serious integration problems [15]. Most of them are victims of civil wars and not of political persecution, which means that only a few of them are granted refugee status. For the others, the situation often amounts to what is called a "tolerance status", prohibiting adults from working. While the unemployment rates among other immigrant populations varies between 18 per cent and 28 per cent, the unemployment rate among refugees coming from Arab countries is close to 90 per cent. In Berlin, more than a third of students of foreign origin left school without graduating in 2006. Among the children of refugees from Lebanon, this figure is twice as high [16].

“Expressed in emotional terms, what is under the microscope here is the betrayal and loss of Muslim identity: a Muslim who attempts to understand Zionism would no longer be a Muslim”

This extremely precarious legal and economic situation makes integration extremely difficult. In such a vacuum, extremist and antisemitic ideas find a ready audience and are then moulded to the circumstances. A demonstration of this can be found in the lyrics to a rap track popular in schools in the Kreuzberg and Neukölln districts in Berlin: "I am a Nazi, Hey so what / You other Nazis, do not say no / Kill every Jewish pig(...) They must all die here / The Arabs are going to dominate here / Palestine is going to prevail / (...) Allahu Akhbar."

This song is violently illustrates how different elements of identity are combined: sympathy for Nazism, because if its antisemitic basis, and with the Arab nation and with Palestine specifically. But what is also striking is that there is no need to use the terms "Zionism" or "Zionists" as bywords. Within this clash of identities, of "oppressed" against "oppressor", of those who are integrated and accepted against those who are not, it is perfectly acceptable to speak about Jews.

Certainly, this example should be not be interpreted as representing young European Muslims in toto. What the example does is to reveal what is possible, namely, the ease with which modern European taboos concerning antisemitic language and images can be broken.

Conclusion: The Perils of Political Correctness

These depressing realities should not mask positive examples of engagement, especially when it comes to confronting antisemitism. One example is the petition entitled "Antisemitism: zero tolerance", signed by leading Turkish leftist intellectuals and published in the Turkish socialist magazine Birikim in October, 2004. Yet this also raises a difficult question: can initiatives like this petition be said to emanate from a genuinely Muslim voice? Many of those who signed the petition were Jews themselves. Others did not want to be perceived as Muslims or as speaking on behalf of fellow Muslims.

“(T)he degree and intensity of Islamist agitation among European Muslims means that many in these communities respond passively to antisemitism, irrespective of whether it is formally presented as anti-Zionism”

In addition, such resistance to antisemitism does not automatically mean opposition to anti-Zionism. This is not just a problem in the Muslim world: in the west, too, anti-Zionism is now part of the parameters of politically acceptable discourse. This western discomfort with Zionism makes it much easier for the Islamists to advance their position, precisely because of the growing sense that Zionism, if discussed at all, can only be portrayed negatively.

A 2006 youth theater project in Berlin provided a telling illustration of this attitude. Called "Intifada in the Classroom' - and endorsed by many local politicians and NGOs - the play led to a handful of complaints about the negative portrayal of Jews. In response, one of actors retorted: "We're not after the Jews! We're after the Israelis!" [17]. Such statements are exactly what the Islamists want to hear. And the passive reaction of the audience, most of whom were teachers, are exactly what they want to see, as well.